General Equilibrium with Endogenous Trading Constraints by Cea-Echenique, Sebastián & Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
General Equilibrium with Endogenous
Trading Constraints
Sebastia´n Cea-Echenique and Juan Pablo Torres-Mart´ınez
April 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/55359/
MPRA Paper No. 55359, posted 16. April 2014 04:12 UTC
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM WITH ENDOGENOUS TRADING CONSTRAINTS
SEBASTIA´N CEA-ECHENIQUE AND JUAN PABLO TORRES-MARTI´NEZ
Abstract. We build a general equilibrium model where agents are subject to endogenous trading
constraints, making the access to financial trade dependent on prices and consumption decisions.
Besides, our framework is compatible with the existence of endogenous financial segmentation
and credit markets’ exclusion. Two results of equilibrium existence are shown. In the first one,
we assume individuals can super-replicate financial payments buying durable commodities and
investing in assets that give liquidity to all agents. In the second result, under strict monotonic-
ity of preferences, we suppose there are agents that may compensate with increments in present
demand the losses of well-being generated by reductions of future consumption.
Keywords. Incomplete Markets; General Equilibrium; Endogenous Trading Constraints.
JEL Classification. D52, D54.
Date: April 15, 2014.
We are grateful to Antonela Racca for several suggestions and comments. The authors acknowledge financial
support from Conicyt-Chile through Fondecyt project 1120294. Cea-Echenique is grateful to Conicyt-Chile from
financial support. This research was partly undertaken while Torres-Mart´ınez was visiting the Department of
Economics and Economic History of the University of Salamanca.
Sebastia´n Cea-Echenique
Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Chile
Centre d’E´conomie de la Sorbonne, University of Paris 1
e-mail: secea@fen.uchile.cl
Juan Pablo Torres-Mart´ınez
Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Chile
e-mail: juan.torres@fen.uchile.cl.
2 CEA-ECHENIQUE AND TORRES-MARTI´NEZ
1. Introduction
The differentiated access to commodity or asset markets endogenously emerges due to regulatory
or institutional considerations. As a consequence, several kinds of trading restrictions are observed
in financial markets: margin calls, collateral requirements, short-sale constraints, consumption quo-
tas or income-based access to funding, among others. With the aim of understanding the effects of
those restrictions in competitive markets, a vast literature of general equilibrium has been devel-
oped. That research has given consideration to models where financial trade is restricted by fixed,
price-dependent, or consumption-dependent portfolio constraints. Nevertheless, channels connect-
ing prices with both portfolio constraints and consumption possibilities, have not thoroughly been
addressed by the literature. The objective of this paper is to contribute in this direction.
The existence of competitive equilibria was deeply studied in incomplete markets models where
agents are subject to exogenous portfolio constraints. The case of portfolio restrictions determined
by linear equality constraints is addressed by Balasko, Cass and Siconolfi (1990) for nominal as-
sets, and by Polemarchakis and Siconolfi (1997) for real assets. When portfolio restrictions are
determined by convex and closed sets containing zero, the case of nominal or nume´raire assets is
studied by Cass (1984, 2006), Siconolfi (1987), Cass, Siconolfi and Villanacci (2001), Martins-da-
Rocha and Triki (2005), Won and Hahn (2007, 2012), Aouani and Cornet (2009, 2011), and Cornet
and Gopalan (2010). In the same context, the case of real assets is analyzed by Radner (1972),
Angeloni and Cornet (2006), and Aouani and Cornet (2011). In general terms, these authors prove
equilibrium existence under non-redundancy hypotheses over financial structures and/or financial
survival requirements. Under these assumptions, individuals’ allocations and asset prices can be
endogenously bounded without inducing frictions in the model.
There are also several results that include price-dependent portfolio constraints in nominal or real
assets markets. These models assume that financial constraints are determined by a finite number of
inequalities, and use differentiable techniques to ensure the existence of equilibrium and to analyze
its stability and local-uniqueness. In this context, equilibrium existence is addressed by Carosi, Gori
and Villanacci (2009) for nume´raire asset markets with portfolio constraints, by Gori, Pireddu and
Villanacci (2013) for nume´raire and real asset markets with borrowing constraints, and by Hoelle,
Pireddu, and Villanacci (2012) for real asset markets with wealth-dependent credit limits.
In addition, Seghir and Torres-Mart´ınez (2011) propose a model where trading constraints restrict
the access to debt in terms of first-period consumption. Financial survival conditions are not
required, and the relationship between financial access and individual consumption allows to include
financial practices as collateralized borrowing. In order to prove equilibrium existence, they assume
individuals may compensate with increments in present demand the losses on well-being generated
by reductions of future consumption.
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In this paper, we analyze the existence of equilibria in incomplete financial markets when agents
are subject to price-dependent trading constraints that affect the access to commodities and finan-
cial contracts. Furthermore, we make the financial segmentation and exclusion of debt markets
compatible with the existence of a competitive equilibrium. Our approach is general enough to
be compatible with incomplete market economies where there exist wealth-dependent financial ac-
cess, investment-dependent credit access, borrowing constraints precluding bankruptcy, security
exchanges, commodity options with deposit requirements, or assets that are backed by financial
collateral.
We consider a two-period economy with uncertainty about the realization of a state of nature
in the second period. There is a finite number of agents that are able to smooth consumption
across states of nature by trading financial contracts. Moreover, the access to physical and financial
markets is determined by price-dependent trading constraints.
Two results of equilibrium existence are developed. First, we prove that a competitive equilibrium
exists when individuals can super-replicate financial payments buying durable commodities and
investing in assets that give liquidity to all agents (Theorem 1). As particular cases, we obtain
results of equilibrium existence in markets where financial survival conditions hold or where assets
are backed by physical collateral. Secondly, under strict monotonicity of preferences, we prove that
there is an equilibrium when there are agents that can increase their present demand to compensate
any loss of utility generated by a reduction on future consumption (Theorem 2). In particular,
we extend the model and the results of Seghir and Torres-Mart´ınez (2011) to be able to allow
price-dependent trading constraints that affect the access to both debt and investment.
Our model is described in the next section. In Sections 3-5 we characterize the assumptions
on trading constraints. Section 6 gives examples that illustrate our trading rules, and Section 7 is
devoted to state our main results. The proofs of our results are given in appendices.
2. Model
We consider a two-period economy with uncertainty about the realization of a state of nature in
the second period, which belongs to a finite set S. Let S = {0} ∪ S be the set of states of nature in
the economy, where s = 0 denotes the unique state at the first period.
There is a finite set L of perfectly divisible commodities, which are subject to transformation
between periods and that can be traded in spot markets at prices p = (ps)s∈S ∈ RL×S+ . We model
the transformation of commodities between periods by linear technologies (Ys)s∈S . Thus, a bundle
y ∈ RL+ demanded at the first period is transformed, after its consumption and the realization of a
state of nature s ∈ S, into the bundle Ysy ∈ RL+.
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There is a finite set J of financial contracts available for trade at the first period that make
promises contingent to the realization of uncertainty. Let q = (qj)j∈J ∈ RJ+ be the vector of asset
prices and denote by R(p) = (Rs,j(ps))(s,j)∈S×J ∈ RS×J+ the vector of assets’ payments.1
For notation convenience, let P := RL×S+ × RJ+ be the space of commodity and asset prices, and
let E := RL×S+ × RJ be the space of consumption and portfolio allocations.
There is a finite set I of consumers that trade assets in order to smooth their consumption.
Each agent i ∈ I is characterized by a utility function V i : RL×S+ → R, physical endowments
wi = (wis)s∈S ∈ RL×S+ , and trading constraints determined by a correspondence Φi : P E.
Given prices (p, q) ∈ P, each agent i chooses a consumption bundle xi = (xis)s∈S and a portfolio
zi = (zij)j∈J in her choice set C
i(p, q), which is characterized by the set of allocations (xi, zi) ∈ E
satisfying the trading constraint (xi, zi) ∈ Φi(p, q) and the following budget restrictions:
p0 · xi0 + q · zi ≤ p0 · wi0;
ps · xis ≤ ps · (wis + Ysxi0) +
∑
j∈J
Rs,j(ps)z
i
j , ∀s ∈ S.
Definition 1. A vector ((p, q), (xi, zi)i∈I) ∈ P × EI is a competitive equilibrium for the economy
with endogenous markets segmentation when the following conditions hold:
(i) Each agent i ∈ I maximizes her preferences, (xi, zi) ∈ argmax
(xi,zi)∈Ci(p,q)
V i(xi).
(ii) Individuals’ plans are market feasible,
∑
i∈I
(xi0, (x
i
s)s∈S , z
i) =
∑
i∈I
(wi0, (w
i
s + Ysw
i
0)s∈S , 0).
One of our objectives is to determine conditions that make price-dependent trading constraints
{Φi}i∈I compatible with equilibrium existence. Another one is to have within our findings equi-
librium existence results for economies where financial market segmentation and exclusion of credit
markets is observed.
More precisely, we say that there is financial market segmentation when there are contracts that
not all agents can trade, i.e., {j ∈ J : ∃i ∈ I, (xi, zi) ∈ Φi(p, q) =⇒ zij = 0, ∀(p, q) ∈ P} 6= ∅.
Moreover, there exists exclusion of credit markets when there are agents without access to liquidity
through financial contracts, i.e., {i ∈ I : (xi, zi) ∈ Φi(p, q) =⇒ zi ≥ 0, ∀(p, q) ∈ P} 6= ∅.
1Our financial structure is general enough to be compatible with several types of assets. For instance, to include
a nominal asset j it is sufficient to assume that there is (Ns,j)s∈S ∈ RS+ such that Rs,j ≡ Ns,j , ∀s ∈ S. To include a
real asset k we can define payments Rs,k(ps) = psAs,k, ∀s ∈ S, where (As,k)s∈S ∈ RL×S+ .
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Notice that these situations are incompatible with the existence of financial survival , which re-
quires that all agents have access to some amount of liquidity by short-selling any financial contract.
We impose the following assumptions about agents’ characteristics and financial payments:
Assumption (A1)
For any i ∈ I, the following properties hold:
(i) V i is continuous and strongly quasi-concave.2
(ii) V i is strictly increasing in at least one commodity at any state of nature.
(iii) W i = (W is)s∈S := (w
i
0, (w
i
s + Ysw
i
0)s∈S) 0.
Furthermore, for each (s, l) ∈ S × L, there is an agent whose utility function is strictly increasing
in commodity l at state of nature s.
Assumption (A2)
For each j ∈ J , {Rs,j}s∈S are continuous and satisfy (Rs,j(ps))s∈S 6= 0, ∀p ∈ RL×S++ .
The requirements imposed in Assumption (A1) are classical. Assumption (A2) guarantees that
asset payments are non-trivial and do not compromise the continuity of choice set correspondences.
3. Basic Assumptions on Trading Constraints
In this section we introduce the basic assumptions over trading constraints. We depart with
hypotheses that ensure that the well behavior of choice sets is not affected by trading constraints.
To shorten notations, given j ∈ J , let êj ∈ E be the plan composed by one unit of investment in j.
Assumption (A3)
For any agent i ∈ I, Φi is lower hemicontinuous with closed graph and convex values.
Assumption (A4)
For any i ∈ I and (p, q) ∈ P the following properties hold:
(i) If (xi, zi) ∈ Φi(p, q), then (yi, zi) ∈ Φi(p, q), ∀yi ≥ xi. Also, (0, 0) ∈ Φi(p, q).
(ii) For every j ∈ J there is an agent h ∈ I such that Φh(p, q) + êj ⊆ Φh(p, q).
2Strongly quasi-concavity of V i requires that V i(λxi + (1− λ)yi) > min{V i(xi), V i(yi)} when V i(xi) 6= V i(yi).
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Under Assumption (A3) trading constraints do not compromise the continuity or the convexity
of choice set correspondences. Moreover, agents are not required to trade financial contracts if they
want to demand a portion of initial endowments or increase consumption departing from a trading
feasible allocation (Assumption (A4)(i)). Assumption (A4)(ii) requires that for any financial con-
tract there is at least one agent that can increase her long position on it.3
Example 1 (Exogenous Portfolio Constraints)
Assume that, for every i ∈ I, Φi(p, q) = RL×S+ × Zi, ∀(p, q) ∈ P, where Zi ⊆ RJ . Then,
Assumption (A3) is satisfied if and only if {Zi}i∈I are closed and convex sets. Assumption (A4)(i)
holds if and only if 0 ∈ ⋂i∈I Zi. Assumption (A4)(ii) holds if and only if, for each asset j there is
an agent i such that Zi + ~ej ⊆ Zi, where ~ej is the j-th canonical vector of RJ .
Notice that, (A3) and (A4) are satisfied when {Zi}i∈I are linear spaces and {~ej}j∈J ⊂
⋃
i∈I Z
i.
Also, if trading constraints only restrict the access to credit (i.e., Zi +RJ+ ⊆ Zi, ∀i ∈ I), then (A3)
and (A4) hold if and only if {Zi}i∈I are closed and convex sets containing zero. 2
Example 2 (Price-Dependent Borrowing Constraints)
Assume that, for every i ∈ I,
Φi(p, q) = {(xi, zi) ∈ E : zi + gik(p, q) ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,mi}}, ∀(p, q) ∈ P,
where mi ∈ N and gik = (gik,j) : P→ RJ+ , ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,mi}. In this context, Assumptions (A3) and
(A4) are satisfied if and only if {gik}1≤k≤mi are continuous for every i ∈ I. 2
4. Bounds on Attainable Allocations
Restrictions on trading constraints are also imposed by assumptions over the correspondence of
attainable allocations Ω : P  EI , defined as the set-valued mapping that associates prices with
market feasible allocations satisfying individuals’ budget and trading constraints, i.e.,
Ω(p, q) :=
{
((xi, zi))i∈I ∈
∏
i∈I
Ci(p, q) :
∑
i∈I
(xi, zi) =
∑
i∈I
(W i, 0)
}
.
Notice that, any element of Ω(p, q) satisfies budget constraints with equality.
Assumption (A5)(i)
For every compact set P′ ⊆ P,
⋃
(p,q)∈P′: (p,q)0
Ω(p, q) is bounded.
3Under Assumption (A3), (A4)(i) is equivalent to require that: ∀j ∈ J , ∃i ∈ I : Φi(p, q)+δêj ⊆ Φi(p, q), ∀δ > 0.
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Assumption (A5)(ii)
If the projection of P′ ⊆ P on RL×S+ is a compact set, then
⋃
(p,q)∈P′: (p,q)0
Ω(p, q) is bounded.
In our results of equilibrium existence, we require sets of attainable allocations to be uniformly
bounded in the sense of (A5)(i) or (A5)(ii). Assumption (A5)(ii), which is stronger than (A5)(i),
holds when J is composed by non-redundant nominal assets, by collateralized assets, or when agents
are subject to exogenous short-sale constraints—i.e., when for every i ∈ I there exists m ∈ RJ+ such
that (xi, zi) ∈ Φi(p, q) =⇒ zi ≥ −m, ∀(p, q) ∈ P.
The existence of upper bounds on attainable allocations is directly related with the non-redundancy
of the financial structure. That is, the non-existence of unbounded sequences of trading admissible
portfolios that do not generate commitments.
To formalize this relationship, given (p, q) ∈ P and i ∈ I, define
Ai0(p, q) :=
{
zi ∈ RJ \ {0} : q · zi = 0 ∧ R(p)zi = 0 ∧ (W i, δzi) ∈ Φi(p, q), ∀δ > 0} ,
Ai1(p, q) :=
{
zi ∈ RJ \ {0} : R(p)zi = 0 ∧ (W i, δzi) ∈ Φi(p, q), ∀δ > 0} .
We focus our attention on two non-redundancy conditions, which are defined for every non-
empty set P′ ⊆ P. The first one, is a generalization of the requirement imposed by Siconolfi (1987,
Assumption (A5)) in nominal asset markets with exogenous portfolio constraints,
(NR1(P
′))
⋃
i∈I
Ai1(p, q) = ∅, ∀(p, q) ∈ P′.4
The second one, avoids the existence of unbounded sequences of trading admissible portfolios that
do not implement transfers of wealth among states of nature, i.e.,
(NR0(P
′))
⋃
i∈I
Ai0(p, q) = ∅, ∀(p, q) ∈ P′.
Since Ai0(p, q) ⊆ Ai1(p, q), for every non-empty set P′ ⊆ P, NR0(P′) is weaker than NR1(P′).
4Assume that assets are nominal, i.e., R(p) ≡ N , and that trading constraints are given by exogenous portfolio
restrictions, i.e., for every agent i there is a set Zi ⊆ RJ such that Φi(p, q) = RL×S+ × Zi, ∀(p, q) ∈ P. Then,
(NR1(P′)) holds if and only if the following non-redundancy condition imposed by Siconolfi (1987) holds,⋃
i∈I
{
zi ∈ RJ \ {0} : Nzi = 0 ∧ δzi ∈ Zi, ∀δ > 0
}
= ∅.
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Proposition 1. Under Assumptions (A1)-(A4), for every P′ ⊆ P non-empty and compact,
NR0(P′) =⇒
⋃
(p,q)∈P′
Ω(p, q) is bounded =⇒ 0 /∈
⋃
(p,q)∈P′
⋃
I′⊆I
∑
i∈I′
Ai0(p, q).
Thus, each non-redundancy condition, NR1(P′) or NR0(P′), guarantees that Assumption (A5)(i)
holds. Furthermore, as the following example illustrates, when assets are nominal and trading
constraints are exogenous, Assumption (A5)(i) is weaker than the traditional non-redundancy hy-
pothesis imposed by Siconolfi (1987).
Example 3. Consider an economy with exogenous trading constraints and nominal assets. There
are three agents I = {1, 2, 3} and two assets J = {1, 2}, which have identical payments satisfying
N1,1 = N1,2 = 1 and (Ns,j)s6=1 = 0, ∀j ∈ J . Also, there is m > 0 such that, Z1 = [−m,+∞)×{0},
Z2 = {0}× [−m,+∞), and Z3 = [−m,+∞)× (−∞, 0]. Then, Assumption (A5)(ii) holds, although{
z ∈ RJ \ {0} : Nz = 0 ∧ δz ∈ Z3, ∀δ > 0} 6= ∅. 2
5. Upper Bounds on Asset Prices
One of the main steps in any proof of equilibrium existence is to ensure that endogenous vari-
ables can be bounded without inducing frictions over individual demand correspondences. Under
Assumption (A5) we can obtain natural upper bounds for individual allocations. However, it is also
necessary to ensure that prices can be bounded. With this objective, some authors impose financial
survival conditions, assuming that every agent has access to resources by short-selling any financial
contract (see Angeloni and Cornet (2006), Hahn and Won (2007), and Aouani and Cornet (2009,
2011)). Notwithstanding, as we want to include financial market segmentation, we need to follow
alternative approaches to establish bounds for asset prices.
Before discussing these alternatives, we introduce some concepts.
Definition 2. A financial contract j ∈ J is an ultimate source of liquidity when, given (p, q) ∈ P
with p0 = 0, there exists (θ(p, q), ζ(p, q)) ∈ (0, 1)× (0, 1) such that, each agent i can short-sell ζ(p, q)
units of asset j in order to demand the bundle ((1 + θ(p, q))W i0, ((1− θ(p, q))W is)s∈S).
Thus, agents have access to liquidity even when they cannot obtain resources by selling physical
endowments. It follows that, under Assumptions (A3)-(A4), an ultimate source of liquidity is a con-
tract that any agent can short-sale in order to make trading-feasible a small increment on current
consumption in exchange of a reduction on future demand. For notation convenience, let Ju be the
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(possibly empty) maximal subset of J composed by contracts that are ultimate sources of liquidity.
Assumption (A6)
(i) Given j ∈ Ju, for every i ∈ I we have that Φi(p, q) + êj ⊆ Φi(p, q), ∀(p, q) ∈ P.
(ii) Given j /∈ Ju, for every i ∈ I and (xi, zi) ∈ Φi(p, q),
(xi, zi)− δêj ∈ Φi(p, q), ∀δ ∈ [0,max{zij , 0}], ∀(p, q) ∈ P.
Assumption (A6)(i) requires that all agents have access to invest in each asset belonging to
Ju, while (A6)(ii) holds if and only if long positions for assets in J \ Ju can be reduced without
compromising the trading feasibility of allocations.
We affirm that, under Assumptions (A1)-(A6), if Ju satisfies the super-replication property de-
fined below, then there are endogenous bounds for asset prices.
Definition 3. Agents can super-replicate financial payments investing in contracts Ju and buying
commodities when for any compact set P1 ⊂ (RL+ \ {0})S there exists (x̂, (ẑk)k∈Ju) ≥ 0 such that,
∑
j /∈Ju
Rs,j(ps) > 0 =⇒
∑
j /∈Ju
Rs,j(ps) < psYsx̂+
∑
k∈Ju
Rs,k(ps)ẑk, ∀s ∈ S, ∀(ps)s∈S ∈ P1.
Intuitively, if agents can super-replicate financial payments investing in contracts Ju and buying
commodities, then the price of any traded contract j /∈ Ju can be bounded from above in terms
of (p0, (qk)k∈Ju). In addition, since all agents have access to some amount of credit through any
k ∈ Ju, it is possible to normalize prices (p0, (qk)k∈Ju) without inducing frictions on individual
demand correspondences (see Lemma 3 for detailed arguments).
Notice that, the continuity of assets payments (Assumption (A2)) ensures that any contract j
satisfying (Rs,j(ps))s∈S  0, ∀(ps)s∈S ∈ (RL+\{0})S super-replicates the payments of the remaining
assets. For instance, it holds when j is a risk-free nominal asset, i.e., Rs,j ≡ 1, ∀s ∈ S.
An alternative to obtain upper bounds for asset prices is to have individuals whose preferences
satisfy a kind of impatience condition.
Assumption (A7)
There is a non-empty subset of agents I∗ ⊆ I with strictly monotonic preferences such that:
(i) Given i ∈ I∗ and (ρ, xi) ∈ (0, 1)× RL×S++ , there exists τ i(ρ, xi) ∈ RL+ such that,
V i
(
xi0 + τ
i(ρ, xi), (ρ xis)s∈S
)
> V i(xi).
(ii) Let j /∈ Ju, there exists i ∈ I∗ and zi ∈ RJ+ with zij > 0 and −(0, zi) ∈ Φi(p, q), ∀(p, q) ∈ P.
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Assumption (A7)(i) holds independently of the representation of preferences, and was introduced
by Seghir and Torres-Mart´ınez (2011) to analyze equilibrium existence in a model with borrowing
constraints depending on first-period consumption. Intuitively, it requires the existence of agents
that, in terms of preferences, can compensate any loss in utility associated with a reduction in fu-
ture demand with an increment of present consumption. In particular, Assumption (A7) is satisfied
when there is an agent h such that V h is unbounded on first period consumption and, independent
of prices (p, q) ∈ P, the zero vector belongs to the interior of Φh(p, q).
In this context, the main idea behind the existence of upper bounds for asset prices is as follows:
consider an agent i ∈ I∗ such that, at prices (p, q) ∈ P, her optimal consumption allocation is market
feasible. Suppose that, as an alternative to her optimal strategy, she decides to make a promise on
an asset j /∈ Ju using the borrowed resources to increase first period consumption. Also, assume
that this promise can be paid with her future endowments. As a consequence of (A7), if the new
strategy generates a high enough liquidity, then she will ensure a utility level greater than the one
associated to aggregated endowments. Thus, qj needs to be bounded (see Lemma 5 for detailed
arguments).
Since one of our results of equilibrium existence is related with Seghir and Torres-Mart´ınez (2011),
it is interesting to discuss our assumptions when we restrict the attention to that framework.
Example 4 (Consumption-Dependent Borrowing Constraints)
Suppose that trading constrains are independent of prices and determine restrictions on borrowing
and first-period consumption. Thus, given (p, q) ∈ P and i ∈ I, we assume that
Φi(p, q) = {(xi, zi) ∈ E : ∃(θi, ϕi) ∈ RJ+ × RJ+ , ϕi ∈ Ψi(xi0) ∧ zi = θi − ϕi },
where Ψi = (Ψij) : RL+  RJ+ . In this context, Assumption (A3) holds if and only if {Ψi}i∈I have
a closed and convex graph. Assumption (A4)(i) holds if and only if, for every agent i, 0 ∈ Ψi(xi0)
and Ψi(xi0) ⊆ Ψi(yi0), ∀yi0 ≥ xi0. This last property implies that, to ensure Assumption (A5), it is
sufficient to require that {Ψi}i∈I have bounded values. Since trading constraints only affect short-
sales, Assumptions (A4)(ii) and Assumption (A6) always holds. Assumption (A7)(ii) holds if and
only if there exists δ > 0 such that δ(1, . . . , 1) ∈∑i∈I∗ (Ψij(0))j /∈Ju .
Therefore the hypotheses of the main result in Seghir and Torres-Mart´ınez (2011) imply that
Assumptions (A1)-(A7) hold. 2
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6. Examples of Trading Constraints
In this section we present some examples of trading constraints allowing: wealth-dependent fi-
nancial access, investment-dependent credit access, debt constraints precluding bankruptcy, security
exchanges, commodity options with deposit requirements, and assets that are backed by physical or
financial collateral.
Example 5 (Income-Based Financial Access)
Given (p, q) ∈ P and i ∈ I, assume there exists an asset j such that,
(xi, zi) ∈ Φi(p, q) =⇒ zij ∈ [min{p0 · (τ1 − wi0), 0},max{p0 · (wi0 − τ2), 0}],
where τ1, τ2 ∈ RL+. Then, agent i can short-sale asset j if and only if the value of her first period
endowment is greater than p0τ1. Analogously, she can invest in asset j if and only if her first period
endowment is greater than p0τ2. That is, j can only be traded by high income agents.
If we suppose that for some k ∈ J , (xi, zi) ∈ Φi(p, q) =⇒ zik ∈ [min{p0 · (wi0 − τ1), 0},+∞],
then all agents can invest on k, but only low-income agents can short-sale it. 2
Example 6 (Exclusive Credit Lines)
We can consider the case where the access to credit depends on the amount of investment in some
financial contracts. That is, there exists j ∈ J and J ′ ⊂ J \ {j} such that, for every (p, q) ∈ P and
i ∈ I, we have that
(xi, zi) ∈ Φi(p, q) =⇒ zij ∈
[
min
{
K −
∑
k∈J ′
qkz
i
k, 0
}
,+∞
)
.
Hence, only investors that expend an amount greater than K in assets belonging to J ′ have access
to short-sale the financial contract j. 2
Example 7 (Debt Constraints)
If there is κ ∈ (0, 1) such that, for any (p, q) ∈ P and for some i ∈ I,
(xi, zi) ∈ Φi(p, q) =⇒ κps · (wis + Ysxi0) +
∑
j∈J
Rs,j(ps) min{zij , 0} ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ S,
then agent i’s trading constraints ensure that her debt is not greater than an exogenously-fixed
portion of physical-resources’ value. Notice that, if a portion ρ > κ of physical resources can be
garnished in case of bankruptcy, the above restriction ensures that i honors her commitments. 2
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Example 8 (Security Exchanges)
Suppose that we split the sets of agents and financial contracts such that,
I =
a⋃
r=1
Ir, J =
b⋃
r=1
Jr,
and assume that for every (p, q) ∈ P and i ∈ Ir,
(xi, zi) ∈ Φi(p, q) =⇒

zij ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ G+(Ir);
zij ≤ 0, ∀j ∈ G−(Ir);
zij = 0, ∀j /∈ G+(Ir) ∪G−(Ir),
where G+, G− : {I1, . . . , Ia} {J1, . . . ,Jb} are non-empty valued correspondences.
Then, we obtain a structure of exchanges, {J1, . . . ,Jb}, where an agent i ∈ Ir can only short-sale
assets that are available in the exchanges belonging to G−(Ir), whereas she can only invest in assets
traded in exchanges belonging to G+(Ir). Notice that the markets of debt and investment are not
necessarily segmented, as G+(Ir) and G−(Ir) are not required to be disjoint. Also, by Assumption
(A6)(i), if j ∈ Ju, then j ∈
⋂a
r=1(G+(Ir) ∩G−(Ir)).
Since the same agent can participate in several exchanges—because G+ and G− are not nec-
essarily singled-valued—we obtain a model of exchanges with heterogeneous participation, multi-
membership, and price-dependent trading constraints.5 2
Example 9 (Commodity Options)
Let j ∈ J be a financial contract such that, for every (p, q) ∈ P,
Rs,j(ps) = max{Ysy −K, 0}, ∀s ∈ S,
(xi, zi) ∈ Φi(p, q) =⇒ κ p0 · y + min{zij , 0} ≥ 0,
where y ∈ RL+, K > 0 and κ ∈ [0, 1). Then, j is a commodity option that gives the right to buy
in the second period, at a strike price K, the bundle obtained by the transformation of y through
time. To short-sell this option, agents are required to buy a portion κ of y as guarantee. 2
Example 10 (Collateralized Assets)
We can include non-recourse collateralized assets.6 Indeed, a collateralized contract j can be
characterized by a pair (Cj , (Ds,j(ps))s∈S), where Cj = (Cj,l)l∈L ∈ RL+ \ {0} is the collateral
5Faias and Luque (2013) address an equilibrium model with exchanges where individual preferences satisfy the
kind of impatience condition imposed by Seghir and Torres-Mart´ınez (2011). Different to the example above, they
allow cross listing and transactions fees.
6In the absence of payment enforcement mechanisms over collateral repossession, the monotonicity of preferences
guarantees that borrowers of a collateralized loan always deliver the minimum between promises and collateral values.
Therefore, lenders that finance these loans perfectly foresight the payments that they will receive. Hence, as in
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM WITH ENDOGENOUS TRADING CONSTRAINTS 13
guarantee, and (Ds,j(ps))s∈S ∈ RS+ are the state contingent promises, which determine payments
Rs,j(ps) = min{Ds,j(ps), psYsCj}, ∀s ∈ S. Since borrowers are required to pledge the associated
collateral, we assume that, given (xi, zi) ∈ Φi(p, q), the following properties hold
xi0 + Cjz
i
j ≥ 0, and ((xi0 − αCj , (xis)s∈S), zi) + αêj ∈ Φi(p, q), ∀α ∈ [0,−min{zij , 0}].
Thus, individual consumption plans include the required collateral guarantees and any reduction
in short positions reduces the requirements of collateral. That is, there is no cross-collateralization
of payments, i.e., several loans backed by the same collateral. Notice that, payments associated to
non-recourse collateralized loans can be super-replicated by the collateral bundle.
To include assets backed by financial collateral, we can assume that there are j, k ∈ J such that,
given (p, q) ∈ P and i ∈ I, for any s ∈ S we have that Rs,j = min{Ts,j(ps), Rs,k(ps)} and
(xi, zi) ∈ Φi(p, q) =⇒ ∃(θi, ϕi) ∈ RJ+ × RJ+ : θik ≥ ϕij ∧ zi = θi − ϕi.
where Ts,j : RL+ → R+. Then, each unit of asset j promises to deliver an amount Ts,j(ps) at a state
of nature s, and it is backed by one unit of financial contract k in case of default.7 2
7. Equilibrium Existence
Our first result ensures the compatibility between equilibrium and markets segmentation.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions (A1)-(A5)(i) and (A6), if agents can super-replicate financial pay-
ments investing in assets in Ju and buying commodities, then there exists a competitive equilibrium.
The super-replication property trivially holds when there is an ultimate source of liquidity with
strictly positive payments, when J = Ju or when there is a bundle of commodities that super-
replicate financial payments. Thus, departing from Theorem 1, we can obtain the following results.
Corollary 1. Under Assumptions (A1)-(A5)(i) and (A6), if there exists j ∈ Ju such that
(Rs,j(ps))s∈S  0, ∀(ps)s∈S ∈ (RL+ \ {0})S, then there exists a competitive equilibrium.
Geanakoplos and Zame (2013), we can capture with a same financial contract both the collateralized line of credit
and the collateralized loan obligation (CLO) that passthrough the payments made by borrowers.
7Notice that, as k is used as financial collateral, the investment in it may not be reduced without affecting the
trading feasibility. Thus, under the conditions of Theorem 1, k ∈ Ju.
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Corollary 2. Under Assumptions (A1)-(A5)(i), there is a competitive equilibrium if all assets are
ultimate sources of liquidity (i.e., financial survival holds).
Corollary 3. Under Assumptions (A1)-(A5)(i) and (A6)(ii), there is a competitive equilibrium
if one of the following conditions is satisfied:
(i) all assets are backed by physical collateral;
(ii) all assets are real and claims are measure in units of non-perishable commodities.
In particular, we extend Geanakoplos and Zame (2013) to include financial market segmentation
and price-dependent trading constraints. Notice that, the results above are compatible with the
exclusion of some agents from credit markets only if Ju = ∅. However, as the following result shows,
even without require financial payments to be super-replicated by physical markets it is possible to
guarantee equilibrium existence in a model that allows exclusion of credit markets.
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions (A1)-(A7) there exists a competitive equilibrium for the economy
with endogenous market segmentation.
This result extends Seghir and Torres-Mart´ınez (2011) in order to include price-dependent trad-
ing constraints and investment restrictions. It also guarantees that their main result holds under
weaker assumptions. In fact, we only impose the impatience condition on a subset of agents. More
importantly, they assume that sets of trading admissible short-sales are compact, an hypothesis that
is stronger than Assumption (A5)(ii).8
Recently, Pe´rez-Ferna´ndez (2013) also extends the results of Seghir and Torres-Mart´ınez (2011)
including price-dependent trading constraints in an environment with non-ordered preferences. In
his model, the relationship between investment and debt is more general than ours, because As-
sumption (A7)(ii) does not necessarily hold. However, as in Seghir and Torres-Mart´ınez (2011), it
is assumed that correspondences of trading admissible allocations have compact values.
8. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we extend the theory of general equilibrium with incomplete financial markets to
include price-dependent trading constraints that restrict both consumption alternatives and ad-
missible portfolios. Our approach is general enough to incorporate several types of dependencies
8See Example 4 for a detailed comparison between assumptions in the two models.
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between prices, consumption, and financial access. For instance, the access to liquidity may de-
pend on individuals income, the short-sale of derivatives may require the deposit of margins, and
borrowers could be required to pledge physical and/or financial collateral.
As we want to include financial segmentation and credit-access exclusion, our results of equilib-
rium existence do not rely on financial survival conditions. Hence, we propose two ways to ensure the
existence of a competitive equilibrium, based on either the super-replication of promises (Theorem
1) or a kind of agents’ impatience (Theorem 2). The super-replication property holds when there
is a risk-free nominal asset with unrestricted investment and such that all agents can sell it. The
impatience condition holds when utility functions are unbounded in the first period consumption.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Let P′ ⊆ P be a non-empty and compact set.
Assume that there is an unbounded sequence {(xin, zin)i∈I}n∈N ∈
⋃
(p,q)∈P′ Ω(p, q). Then, there exists a
sequence {(pn, qn)}n∈N ⊆ P′ such that, (xin, zin) ∈ Ω(pn, qn), ∀n ∈ N. Also, Assumption (A4)(i) ensures that,
for every n and i, (W, zin) ∈ Φi(pn, qn), where W = (Ws)s∈S :=
∑
i∈IW
i. Hence, for some agent h there is
an unbounded subsequence {zhnk}k∈N ⊆ {zhn}n∈N such that, for every k ∈ N, zhnk 6= 0, ‖zhnk‖Σ ≤ ‖zhnk+1‖Σ,
and (W, zhnk ) ∈ Φh(pnk , qnk ). Let ((p˜, q˜), z˜h) be a cluster point of {(pnk , qnk ), zhnk/‖zhnk‖Σ}k∈N.
We affirm that, R(p˜)z˜h = 0 and q˜ · z˜h = 0. First, if there is an state of nature s ∈ S such that∑
j∈J Rs,j(p˜s)z˜
h
j < 0, then δ0
∑
j∈J Rs,j(p˜s)z˜
h
j < −2p˜s ·Ws, for some δ0 > 0. This implies that, for k ∈ N
large enough, δ0
∑
j∈J Rs,j(pnk,s)z
h
nk,j
/‖zhnk‖Σ < −2pnk,s ·Ws. Since limk ‖zhnk‖Σ = +∞, it follows that
for k large enough
∑
j∈J Rs,j(pnk,s)z
h
nk,j
< −2pnk,s ·Ws, a contradiction with (xink , zink )i∈I ∈ Ω(pnk , qnk ).
Second, if there is s ∈ S such that ∑j∈J Rs,j(p˜s)z˜hj > 0, then δ1∑j∈J Rs,j(p˜s)z˜hj > 2(#I − 1)p˜s ·Ws, for
some δ1 > 0. Hence, for k ∈ N large enough, we have that∑j∈J Rs,j(pnk,s)zhnk,j > 2(#I−1) pnk,s ·Ws. Due
to
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J Rs,j(pnk,s)z
i
nk,j
= 0, there exists h′ 6= h such that ∑j∈J Rs,j(p˜nk,s)zh′nk,j < −2 p˜nk,s ·Ws, a
contradiction with (xink , z
i
nk )i∈I ∈ Ω(pnk , qnk ). The property q˜ · z˜h = 0 follows by analogous arguments.
In addition, (Wh, δz˜h) ∈ Φh(p˜, q˜) for every δ > 0. Indeed, given δ > 0 there exists k(δ) ∈ N such that
‖zhnk‖Σ ≥ δ,∀k ≥ k(δ). Hence, as Φh has convex values and (W, 0) ∈ Φh(pnk , qnk ) for every k ∈ N, it follows
that (W, δzhnk/‖zhnk‖Σ) ∈ Φh(pnk , qnk ) for any k ≥ k(δ), which in turn implies that (W, δz˜h) ∈ Φh(p˜, q˜).
Furthermore, Assumption (A1) guarantees that there is σ ∈ (0, 1) such that σW  Wh. As for every
δ > 0 we have that (1 − σ)(0, 0) + σ(W, δz˜h/σ) ∈ Φh(p˜, q˜), the property follows from Assumption (A4)(i).
Therefore, z˜h ∈ Ah0 (p˜, q˜), which implies that
⋃
(p,q)∈P′
⋃
i∈I Ai0(p, q) 6= ∅. This concludes the proof of the
first implication.
Notice that, if there is (p, q) ∈ P′ and I′ ⊆ I such that 0 ∈ ∑i∈I′ Ai0(p, q), then for every i ∈ I′ there
is zi ∈ RJ \ {0} such that q · zi = 0, R(p)zi = 0, and (W i, δzi) ∈ Φi(p, q), ∀δ > 0, with ∑i∈I′ zi = 0. We
conclude that,
∑
i∈I′ δz
i = 0 and (W i, δzi) ∈ Ci(p, q), ∀i ∈ I′, ∀δ > 0. Hence, Ω(p, q) is unbounded. 2
16 CEA-ECHENIQUE AND TORRES-MARTI´NEZ
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 1
Given M ∈ N, consider the space P(M) of normalized prices, which is defined by
(p, q) ≡ ((p0, (qk)k∈Ju), (qj)j∈J\Ju , (ps)s∈S) ∈ P(M) := P0 × [0,M ]J\Ju × PS1 ,
where P0 := {y ∈ RL∪Ju+ : ‖y‖Σ = 1}, and P1 := {y ∈ RL+ : ‖y‖Σ = 1}.9
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions (A2), (A3) and (A4)(i), for every agent i ∈ I the choice set correspondence
Ci : P(M) E is lower hemicontinuous with closed graph and non-empty and convex values.
Proof. Fix i ∈ I. Assumption (A4)(i) ensures that for every (p, q) ∈ P the allocation (W i, 0) ∈ Ci(p, q),
which implies that Ci is non-empty valued. Assumptions (A2) and (A3) imply that Ci has convex values
and closed graph. To prove that Ci is lower hemicontinuous, let C˚i : P(M) E be the correspondence that
associates to each (p, q) ∈ P(M) the set of allocations (xi, zi) ∈ Ci(p, q) satisfying budget constraints with
strict inequalities. We affirm that C˚i is lower hemicontinuous and has non-empty values. Since Ci is the
closure of C˚i, these properties imply that Ci is lower hemicontinuous (see Border (1985, 11.19(c))).
Thus, we close the proof ensuring the claimed properties for C˚i.
To prove that C˚i has non-empty values, fix (µ0, µ1) ∈ (0, 1) × (0, 1) such that µ0 > µ1. It follows from
Assumption (A4)(i) that ((µ0W
i
0 , (µ1W
i
s)s∈S), 0) ∈ Φi(p, q) for all (p, q) ∈ P(M).
Notice that, for any (p, q) ∈ P(M) with p0 6= 0 we have that ((µ0W i0 , (µ1W is)s∈S), 0) ∈ C˚i(p, q). Thus,
fix (p, q) ∈ P(M) such that p0 = 0. Since Φi has convex values, it follows from Assumption (A2) that there
exists λ ∈ (0, 1), high enough, such that
(x˜i, z˜i) := λ ((µ0W
i
0 , (µ1W
i
s)s∈S), 0)
+
(1− λ)
max{#Ju, 1}
∑
k∈Ju
[(
W i + θk(p, q)(W
i
0 ,−(W is)s∈S)), 0
)
− ζk(p, q) êk
]
∈ Φi(p, q);
λµ0 +
∑
k∈Ju
(1− λ)
max{#Ju, 1} (1 + θk(p, q)) < 1;
(1− λ)
max{#Ju, 1}
∑
k∈Ju
ζk(p, q) max
(p˜,q˜)∈P(M)
max
s∈S
Rs,k(p˜s) <
λ(µ0 − µ1)
2
min
i∈I
min
(s,l)∈S×L
W is,l;
where (θk, ζk)k∈Ju are the functions that guarantee that contracts in Ju are ultimate sources of liquidity
(see Definition 2). Notice that, the first condition above ensures that (x˜i, z˜i) is trading feasible at prices
(p, q), the second requirement implies that x˜i0  wi0, and the last inequality guarantees that, at each state
of nature s ∈ S, debts can be paid with the resources that became available after the consumption of x˜is.
Thus, the definition of P(M) guarantees that (x˜i, z˜i) ∈ C˚i(p, q). Hence, C˚i has non-empty values.10
To prove that C˚i is lower hemicontinuous, fix (p, q) ∈ P(M) and (xi, zi) ∈ C˚i(p, q). Given a sequence
{(pn, qn)}n∈N ⊂ P(M) that converges to (p, q), the lower hemicontinuity of Φi (Assumption (A3)) en-
sures that there exists a sequence {(xi(n), zi(n))}n∈N ⊂ E converging to (xi, zi) such that (xi(n), zi(n)) ∈
9Trading constraints are not necessarily homogeneous of degree zero in prices. Consequently, the normalization of
prices may induce a selection of equilibria.
10Dividing by max{#Ju, 1} we ensure that the arguments above still hold when Ju is an empty set.
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Φi(pn, qn), ∀n ∈ N. Thus, for n ∈ N large enough, (xi(n), zi(n)) ∈ C˚i(pn, qn). It follows from the sequential
characterization of hemicontinuity that C˚i is lower hemicontinuous (see Border (1985, 11.11(b))). 2
For notation convenience, let (x̂, (ẑk)k∈Ju) be an allocation that allows agents to super-replicate financial
payments when second period commodity prices belong to PS1 . Also, define
Q := max
{
1, ‖x̂‖Σ + max
k∈Ju
ẑk
}
;
Ω := 2 sup
(p,q)∈P(Q): (p,q)0
sup
(xi,zi)i∈I∈Ω(p,q)
∑
i∈I
‖zi‖Σ.
Notice that, Assumption (A5)(i) guarantees that Ω is finite.
Given (p, q) ∈ P(M), for any i ∈ I we consider the truncated choice set Ci(p, q) ∩K, where
K :=
[
0, 2W
]L×S × [−Ω, #I Ω]J ,
W :=
#J #I Ω + ∑
(s,l)∈S×L
∑
i∈I
W is,l
(1 + max
s∈S
max
ps∈P1
∑
j∈J
Rs,j(ps)
)
.
Let ΨM : P(M)×KI  P(M)×KI be the correspondence given by
ΨM (p, q, (x
i, zi)i∈I) = φ0,M ((x
i
0, z
i)i∈I)×
∏
s∈S
φs((x
i
s)i∈I)×
∏
i∈I
φi(p, q),
where
φ0,M ((x
i
0, z
i)i∈I) := argmax
(p0,q)∈P0×[0,M ]J\Ju
p0 ·
∑
i∈I
(xi0 − wi0) + q ·
∑
i∈I
zi;
φs((x
i
s)i∈I) := argmax
ps∈P1
ps ·
∑
i∈I
(xis −W is), ∀s ∈ S;
φi(p, q) := argmax
(xi,zi)∈Ci(p,q)∩K
V i(xi), ∀i ∈ I.
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions (A1)-(A5)(i), ΨM has a non-empty set of fixed points.
Proof. By Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem, it is sufficient to to prove that ΨM has a closed graph with
non-empty and convex values. Since P(M) is non-empty, convex and compact, Berge’s Maximum Theorem
establishes that {φ0,M , {φs}s∈S} have a closed graph with non-empty and convex values.
It remains to prove that the same properties hold for {φi}i∈I . Given i ∈ I, Lemma 1 implies that Ci
has a closed graph with non-empty and convex values. Since K is compact and convex and (W i, 0) ∈ K, it
follows that (p, q) ∈ P(M)  Ci(p, q) ∩ K has a closed graph and non-empty, compact, and convex values.
The proof of Lemma 1 also ensures that Ci is lower hemicontinuous and (W i, 0) ∈ Ci(p, q) ∩ int(K). As
(p, q) ∈ P(M)  int(K) has open graph, it follows that (p, q) ∈ P(M)  Ci(p, q) ∩ int(K) is lower hemi-
continuous (see Border (1985, 11.21(c))). Therefore, (p, q) ∈ P(M)  Ci(p, q) ∩ K is lower hemicontinuous
too (see Border (1985, 11.19(c))). Berge’s Maximum Theorem and the continuity and quasi-concavity of V i
guarantees that φi satisfies the required properties. 2
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Lemma 3. Under Assumptions (A1)-(A5)(i) and (A6), assume that agents can super-replicate financial
payments investing in assets Ju and buying commodities. Let (p, q, (xi, zi)i∈I) be a fixed point of ΨM such
that p 0 and ∑
i∈I
zik ≤ 0, ∀k ∈ Ju;
∑
i∈I
xis,l < 2W, ∀(s, l) ∈ S × L.
Then, for any j /∈ Ju we have that,
qj > 0 ∧
∑
i∈I
zij > 0 =⇒ qj ≤ Q .
Proof. Let j /∈ Ju such that qj > 0 and
∑
i∈I z
i
j > 0. Due to p  0, it follows from (A2) that
(Rs,j(ps))s∈S 6= 0. Hence, there exists a ∈ S such that
∑
r/∈Ju Ra,r(pa) > 0. Since financial payments can
be super-replicated by investments in L ∪ Ju, it follows from Definition 3 that∑
r/∈Ju
Ra,r(pa) < paYax̂+
∑
k∈Ju
Ra,k(pa)ẑk ≤ paYax̂+
(
max
k∈Ju
ẑk
) ∑
k∈Ju
Ra,k(pa).
We affirm that,
qj ≤ p0x̂+
(
max
k∈Ju
ẑk
) ∑
k∈Ju
qk.
Let i be an agent that invests in asset j. If the inequality above does not hold, then there is ε > 0 such that,
i can reduce her long position on asset j in εzij units, change her first-period consumption to x
i
0 + εz
i
j x̂,
and increase in (maxr∈Ju ẑr)εz
i
j units the investment in each k ∈ Ju.11 With this strategy, i changes her
wealth at state of nature s ∈ S by(
psYsx̂+
(
max
k∈Ju
ẑk
) ∑
k∈Ju
Rs,k(ps)−Rs,j(ps)
)
εzij ≥ 0,
where the last inequality follows from Definition 3 and holds as strict inequality for s = a. This contradicts
the optimality of (xi, zi) on Ci(p, q) ∩K. We conclude that qj ≤ Q. 2
Lemma 4. Under Assumptions (A1)-(A5)(i) and (A6), assume that agents can super-replicate financial
payments investing in assets Ju and buying commodities. Then, for any M > Q the fixed points of ΨM are
competitive equilibria.
Proof. Given M > Q, let (p, q, (xi, zi)i∈I) be a fixed point of ΨM . Adding first period budget constraints
across agents, the definition of φ0,M guarantees that,
p0 ·
∑
i∈I
(xi0 − wi0) + q ·
∑
i∈I
zi ≤ p0 ·
∑
i∈I
(xi0 − wi0) + q ·
∑
i∈I
zi ≤ 0, ∀ (p0, q) ∈ P0 × [0,M ]J\Ju .
Hence, ∑
i∈I
(xi0 − wi0) ≤ 0,
∑
i∈I
zik ≤ 0, ∀k ∈ Ju,
11As the new strategy needs to be on K, the value of ε may depend on (qj , xi0, (zik)k∈Ju , z
i
j).
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and qj = M for every j /∈ Ju such that
∑
i∈I z
i
j > 0. Furthermore, adding individual budget constraints at
any state of nature in the second period, the definition of K guarantees that,
ps ·
∑
i∈I
(xis −W is) ≤ ps ·
∑
i∈I
(xis −W is) ≤W, ∀ps ∈ P1, ∀s ∈ S.
We obtain that
∑
i∈I x
i
s,l < 2W, ∀(s, l) ∈ S×L, which implies that p 0. In another case, Assumptions
(A1) and (A4)(i) guarantee that at least one agent can improve her utility by increasing her consumption
without additional costs. A contradiction to the optimality of plans (xi, zi)i∈I .
The strict positivity of commodity prices has several consequences. First, by Assumption (A2) asset
promises are non-trivial and Assumptions (A1) and (A4)(ii) ensure that asset prices are strictly positive.
Second, as (p, q, (xi, zi)i∈I) satisfies the hypotheses of Lemma 3 and M > Q, we obtain that
∑
i∈I z
i ≤ 0.
Third, Assumption (A1) guarantees that budget constraints are satisfied by equality.
We conclude that,
(p, q) ∈ P(Q), (p, q) 0,
∑
i∈I
(xi −W i) = 0,
∑
i∈I
zi = 0,
and Assumption (A5)(i) implies that (xi, zi)i∈I ∈ Ω(p, q) ∩ int(K).12
As for any i ∈ I the allocation (xi, zi) belongs to Ci(p, q) ∩ int(K), given (xi, zi) ∈ Ci(p, q) with xi 6= xi
there exists λ ∈ (0, 1) such that λ(xi, zi) + (1 − λ)(xi, zi) ∈ Ci(p, q) ∩ K. The strongly quasi-concavity of
utility functions (Assumption (A1)) implies that,
V i(λ(xi, zi) + (1− λ)(xi, zi)) > min{V i(xi), V i(xi)}.
Since (xi, zi) ∈ φi(p, q), we obtain that V i(xi) < V i(xi). Thus, (xi, zi) is an optimal choice for agent i in
Ci(p, q), which concludes the proof. 2
Appendix C
Proof of Corollary 1. Notice that, given a compact set P1 ⊂ (RL+ \ {0})S , the allocation
(x̂, (ẑk)k∈Ju) := max
p∈P1
∑
s∈S
∑
k/∈Ju
Rs,k(ps)/Rs,j(ps)
 êj
satisfies the conditions of Definition 3. Thus, agents can super-replicate financial payments just by investing
in asset j. 2.
Proof of Corollary 2. Since all assets are ultimate sources of liquidity, the results of Lemma 3 are not
necessary to ensure equilibrium existence. Thus, Assumption (A6) can be dispensed. 2.
12Assumption (A5)(i) is only required to ensure that
[
(p, q) 0 ∧ (xi, zi)i∈I ∈ Ω(p, q)
]
=⇒ (xi, zi)i∈I ∈ int(K).
Notice that, if we change the upper bound Ω for an arbitrary positive number in the definition of K, then all the
other arguments in the proof of Theorem 1 still hold.
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Proof of Corollary 3. Since assets are either backed by physical collateral or have payments measured
in units of a non-perishable commodity (i.e., a commodity l ∈ L such that Ys(l, l) > 0, ∀s ∈ S), it follows
that agents can super-replicate the financial payments by buying commodities. Thus, the result of Lemma
3 can be obtained without assuming that assets in Ju have unrestricted investment (Assumption (A6)(i)).2
Appendix D: Proof of Theorem 2
Let P = {(ps)s∈S ∈ RL×S+ : ‖ps‖Σ ≤ 1, ∀s ∈ S}.
Given N > 0, define
K̂(N) :=
[
0, 2Ŵ +N
]L×S
×
[
−Ω̂, #I Ω̂
]J
,
where
Ŵ :=
#J #I Ω̂ + ∑
(s,l)∈S×L
∑
i∈I
W is,l
(1 + max
s∈S
max
ps∈P1
∑
j∈J
Rs,j(ps)
)
,
Ω̂ := 2 sup
(p,q)∈P×RJ+ : (p,q)0
sup
(xi,zi)i∈I∈Ω(p,q)
∑
i∈I
‖zi‖Σ.
Notice that, Assumption (A5)(ii) guarantees that Ω̂ is finite.
Let Ψ(M,N) be the correspondence obtained by replacing K by K̂(N) in the definition of ΨM . Hence,
identical arguments to those given in the proof of Theorem 1 ensure that, under Assumptions (A1)-(A5)(ii),
and even with Ju = ∅, the results of Lemmata 1 and 2 still hold. Thus, we focus on the determination of
upper bounds for prices (qj)j /∈Ju .
Lemma 5. Under Assumptions (A1)-(A7), let (p, q, (xi, zi)i∈I) be a fixed point of Ψ(M,N) satisfying x
i
s,l <
2Ŵ , ∀(s, l) ∈ S × L. Then, there is Q̂ > 0 such that, for N large enough, we have that qj ≤ Q̂, ∀j /∈ Ju.
Proof. For any i ∈ I∗, let ρi ∈ (0, 1) such that 2Ŵρi = 0.25 min
l∈L
W is,l. Hence, Assumption (A7)(i) and the
strict monotonicity of preferences imply that,
V i(xi) ≤ V i(2Ŵ (1, . . . , 1)) < V i
(
2Ŵ (1, . . . , 1) + τ i(ρi, 2Ŵ ),
(
W is
2
)
s∈S
)
.
Fix j /∈ Ju and i = i(j) ∈ I∗ satisfying Assumption (A7)(ii). Then, there is zi ≥ 0 such that zij > 0
and −(0, zi) ∈ Φi(p, q), ∀(p, q) ∈ P. Since Φi has convex values and (0, 0) ∈ Φi(p, q), it follows that
−(0, εzi) ∈ Φi(p, q), ∀ε ∈ [0, 1]. Also, Assumption (A2) ensures that there is εi ∈ (0, 1) such that, for any
state of nature s ∈ S, εi maxps∈P1
∑
k∈J Rs,k(ps) z
i
k <
(
minl∈LW is,l
)
/2.
Then, for each N > N̂ := max
i∈I∗
‖τ i(ρi, 2Ŵ )‖Σ we have that
((
2Ŵ (1, . . . , 1) + τ i(ρi, 2Ŵ ),
(
W is
2
)
s∈S
)
, −εizi
)
∈ Φi(p, q) ∩ K̂(N).
Consequently, as (xi, zi) is an optimal choice for agent i in Ci(p, q) ∩ K̂(N), it follows that
2Ŵ‖p0‖Σ + p0 · (τ i(ρi, 2Ŵ )− wi0) > εi q · zi ≥ εiqjzij ,
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which implies that qj ≤ (2Ŵ + N̂)/(εizij). Since i = i(j) was fixed, we can consider
Q̂ := max
j /∈Ju
2Ŵ + N̂
εi(j)z
i(j)
j
. 2
Lemma 6. Under Assumptions (A1)-(A7), fix (M,N)  (Q̂, N̂). Then, each fixed point of Ψ(M,N) is a
competitive equilibria.
This result follows from analogous arguments to those made in the proof of Lemma 4.
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